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srATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a civil action instituted by Respondent for damages for breach
of lease on September 12, 1980, after trial, judgment was entered on behalf of
Respondent; on November 3, 1981, Appellant moved, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(l)&(7),
for relief from the judgment.
DisrosITION IN LOWER COURT
'Ihe Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding, denied Appellant's motion for relief from the judgment.

RELIEF SOUGHr ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an Order affinning the decision of the District Court.
srATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
Respondent, Valley Leasing, a Division of Intermountain Loan Corporation, a Utah corporation, is engaged in the commercial leasing of equipnent.

It

carries no inventory of equipnent, but instead, purchases equipnent preselected
by a prospective lessee and then enters into a lease agreement.
lines 16-22.

TR. R. p. 4,

In 1980, Appellant had selected certain equipnent from an equipnent

dealer that he wanted to lease.

'Ihe dealer referred Appellant to Respondent.

TR.. R. p. 4, lines 11-15, p. 6, lines 1-15. On January 23, 1980, Valley Leasing
and Mr. Houghton discussed the lease of a backhoe and Valley Leasing ran a
credit check on Mr. Houghton who was self-employed in the contruction business.
TR. R. p. 5, line 1-25.

The backhoe was purchased by Respondent from Century
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Equipment for lease to Mr. Houghton.

'IR. R. p.

6, lines 11-15. A lease was

executed on January 25, 1980.
The closing on the lease took place in St. George, Utah, at the place
of business of Appellant and Appellant paid by check the sum of $2,984.43, which
represented a security deposit and the first month's lease payment.
6, lines 16-25, p. 7, lines 1-8.

'Th.e lease executed by Mr. Houghton comnenced

January, 1980, for a term of forty-two months.

'Th.e check initially given to

Valley Leasing by Mr. Houghton bounced and never was made good.
ments were ever made by Mr. Houghton.

No other pay-

Mr. Houghton was in possession of the

equipnent for approximately three months.
2-8.

'IR. R. p.

IB. R. p. 7, lines 2-12, p. 9, lines

At the t:llne of the closing on the lease, Mr. Houghton had taken delivery

of the equipment, and, at the closing, signed a delivery and acceptance certificate indicating satisfaction with the equipnent so delivered.
Respondent retook possession of the equipnent.

In April, 1980,

'IR. R. p. 6, lines 1-10, p.

8,

lines 4-13.
On September 19, 1980, Respondent filed suit in the Third Judicial

District Court for the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, seeking damages for
breach of lease.

On or about October

7, 1980, counsel appeared on behalf of

Appellant and filed an Answer to Respondent's Complaint.

On October 14, 1980,

Respondent filed a Request for Trial Setting, and, on November 26, 1980, the
matter was set for a non-jury trial on October 1, 1981.
Notice of trial setting was sent to counsel for Respondent and
counsel for Appellant.

On or about December 15, 1981, attorneys for Appellant

withdrew as counsel, filing a Withdrawal of Counsel pursuant to Utah Rules of

-2-
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Civil Procedure and stating the date in which the matter had been set for trial
in their notice.

'Ihis motion was mailed to Appellant at his address at 513

North 500 West, St. George, Utah 84770.

'Ihis was at the time, and presently is

Appellant's permanent address.

On September 11, 1981, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge of the
Third Judicial District of Salt Lake CoW1ty, entered an order for pre-trial
settlement conference and appearance of counsel and parties.

The order was

mailed to counsel for Respondent and previous coW1sel for Appellant.

On Septem-

ber 16, 1981, Respondent mailed to Appellant, Notice to Appoint New Counsel.

On September 25, 1981, Mr. Thomas N. Arnett, Jr., who formerly represented Appellant, wrote to Appellant at the same address to which he addressed
his Withdrawal of Counsel, indicating that he had withdrawn, that trial had been
set for October 1, 1981, and that they had received a pre-trial order for
September 22, 1981.

Mr. Arnett, in his letter noted that he would not be appear-

ing on behalf of Appellant on October 1, 1981 for the reason that Appellant

"failed to ever provide us with a retainer".

Further, said letter detailed

the fact that Mr. Houghton had ma.de no contact with the firm since he first
brought the Summons and Complaint to them nor had he ever answered their letters.

Mr. Arnett advised Mr. Houghton to obtain counsel or appear on his own behalf
at the trial.
At the pre-trial hearing counsel for Respondent appeared, but neither
Appellant nor any coW1sel for Appellant appeared.
On

October 1, 1981, Respondent appeared for trial, but neither Appellant

nor any attorney representing Appellant appeared.

-3-

Appellant's wife did appear,
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apparently at Appellant's request, for the purpose of representing him, but was
not allowed to do so as she was not a party to the action nor an attorney.
The Court took testimony of Respondent and after said testimony,
judgment was entered against Appellant for a total sum of $15,681.56.
On November

3, 1981, Appellant filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment.

Subsequently, after submission of affidavits from Appellant and oral argument,
this Motion was denied by the District Court.

Appellant now prosecutes this

-

Appeal frcm that denial.
ARGUMENT
IDINT I

APPELLANT IS LIMITED TO RELIEF UNDER RULE 59,
UI1AH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that, subject to the
provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted only in a lirni ted number of
circumstances.

Appellant has not pled compliance with Rule 59 and claims that

Rule 59 is not applicable to this case.

~:

failed to appear for the pre-trial conference, the Court indicated that it
would be willing to handle the matter as a default matter in terms of the
burden placed on Respondent in presenting evidence at trial.

It should be

noted, however, that no default was entered against Appellant at the pre-trial
conference, nor was any default entered subsequently.

-4-
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'.':

Respondent appeared for trial and produced evidence.

Findings of F'act

and Conclusions of Law and Judgment were entered after trial.

At no time was

the Answer of Appellant stricken, nor any default judgment entered.
had before it facts sufficient for the entry of judgment upon trial.

The Court
While

the trial Court may have indicated a willingness to handle the case on a default
basis, nothing in the record indicates that it, in fact, did so.

Indeed, the

trial transcript is fully consistent with the entry of judgment upon trial, not
a default judgment.
It is Respondent's contention, therefore, that Rule 59 applies and
that Rule 60(b) is not applicable to this action.
IDINT II

APPELLANT HAS FAILED 'ID ESTABLISH SUFFICIENT BASIS
ID SEr ASIDE THE LOWER COURT'S ORDER DENYING HIS MDrION
FDR RELIEF UNDER RULE 60 (b) , UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Appellant has moved, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(l) & (7), for this Court
to reverse the judgrnent of the trial Court in refusing to vacate a judgment
entered after trial.

It is well established law that a trial court may be

reversed only if an abuse of discretion is clearly shown in the record.

Warren

vs. Dixon Ranch Company, 260 P. 2d 741 (Utah, 1953), Salt Lake Hardware Company
vs. Nelson Land and Water Company, 134 P. 911 (Utah, 1913).

Pursuant to Rule

6l(b)(l), Appellant must show that excusable neglect exists and that it was so
clearly established that it -was an abuse of discretion for the trial Court to
refUse to set aside the judgment.
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Excusable neglect has been reviewed by this Court in detail before.
In Warren vs. Dixon, the Court stated:

"In order for this Court to overturn

the discretion of the lower Court in refusing to vacate a valid judgment,
the requirements of public policy demand more than a mere statement that a
person did not have his day in court when full opportunity for a fair hearing
was afforded to him or his legal representative".

At page 744.

A review of the cases cited by Appellant in his brief where this Court
has reversed the lower court is instructive.
In Helgesen vs. Inyangumia,

636 P. 2d 1079 (Utah, 1981) an insurance

adjuster in negotiation with plaintiff's counsel, failed to turn over the
Surrmons and Complaint to his attorney before entry of default for the reason
that he was awaiting further information promised by plaintiff's counsel and
expected to negotiate further on the claim.

The default was taken without

prior notice to the trusting adjuster.
In Mayhew vs. Standard Gilsonite Company,

376 P. 2d 951 (Utah, 1962),

plaintiff served the just resigned president of a financially troubled corporation, having about 3,000 shareholders, whose affairs were in a caotic state.
Other than the just resigned president, there was no other in state, responsible
officer and, before the shareholders were able to hire local counsel, a default
judgment had been entered.
In these cases, defendants could be said to have exercised due diligence

with regard to the suits filed and no substantial delay was caused to plaintiff
when the motion for relief from the judgment was filed.

In Mayhew, events beyond

control of the shareholders of the corporation caused the default.

In Helgesen,

counsel for plaintiff gave less than the usual courtesies when taking a default
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without notice to an agent of defendant who was waiting for further information from that attorney.
Contrast this with the cases cited by Appellant in his brief where the
lower court's ruling was not disturbed.
In Airkem Intermountain Inc., vs. Parker, 513 P. 2d 4?5 (Utah, 1973),
defendant was sued on January 26, 1972 and filed an Answer through counsel on
February 8, 1972.

However, he failed to contact his attorney from February,

1972 to September 21, 1972, the date of trial. Defendant 1mew that he was difficult to contact because of his working hours, but in an ai'fidavit, claimed
he had a terminally ill spouse who was in a nursing home for three months just
prior to trial.
which was denied.
Court noted:

Just before trial, defendant's counsel attempted to withdraw,
Neither defendant nor his counsel appeared for trial._ The

"His failure to contact his counsel under such circumstances from

February to September 21, 1972, could reasonably be considered as not constituting due diligence by the trial court •••

Since defendant's conduct was not

entirely inexcusable, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing
to relieve defendant of the judgment".

At page 431.

In Warren vs. Dixon Ranch Company, one Arnold Dixon was served with
process.

At the t:Une of service he was ill.

He failed to file an Answer.

Another shareholder, well after default was entered, attempted to file an
Answer and Counterclaim.

This Court noted that, while discretion of the lower

court should be exercised in defendant's behalf in doubtful cases:

"The

movant must show that he has used due diligence and that he was prevented from
appearing by circumstances over which he had no control".

At page 743.
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Illness

at the time of service of process, under these circumstances, was not "excusable neglect".

See also, Peterson vs. Crosier, 81 P. 860 (Utah, 1905) and

Airkem Intermountain, Inc., at page 431.
Appellant's case fits the pattern of Airkem Intermountain Inc. and
Warren.
(1)

Appellant had a full opportunity for a fair hearing.

Appellant

was afforded a trial on October 1, 1981, notice of which was given to his
former counsel and to him by his counsel in a letter, addressed to him at his
then current and now current address.
(2)

Appellant's clear neglect of his rights and responsibilities

was the cause of his failure to appear at trial.

Appellant's former counsel

mailed to Appellant its Withdrawal of Counsel noting the time of trial, on
December 15, 1980.

Also, the letter of former counsel, dated September 25,

1981, (addressed to the same address, which Appellant acknowledges as having
received), makes clear that former counsel had mailed him not only the Withdrawal of Counsel notice and had advised him of the October 1, trial setting,
but, in addition, that they had sent other letters since they first appeared
on his behalf and that he had never answered their letters or contacted them
since the initial contact.

Appellant was mailed a Notice to Appoint New

Counsel in this case on September 16, 1982.

None of these letters and notices

prompted Appellant to either appear at trial or hire an attorney to represent
him.

Appellant claims in his Affidavit that he requested his wife to go to
the courtroom on October 1, 1981 to present his case.
gave no reason for not appearing at trial.

In that Affidavit he

Mrs. Houghton was not a party to
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the action.

In a supplemental Affidavit filed by Mr. Houghton on November

18, 1981, Appellant stated that, "Notice was insufficient to allow him to arrange
his business and travel to Salt Lake City".

It is to be noted that Mr. Houghton,

as a self-employed contractor, is presumably capable of arranging his work as
he wishes.

More to the point, he still failed to give any specific reasons why

he was unable to appear for trial.

Apparently, Appellant felt it was inconven-

ient for him to appear and he sent his wife to represent him.

Appellant's affi-

davits, it is submitted, fall far short of establishing the statutory standard
required of Appellant to exercise due diligence.
Indeed, Appellant's position recalls the language of this Court in
Peterson vs. Crosier:
A party cannot thus intentionally remain away from a trial
to which he is a party for the purpose of giving his attention
to and performing other business duties of a purely private
character, and, after judgment has been rendered against him,
have the same set aside and the case reopened on the ground
of excusable neglect. If courts and judicial proceedings were
thus conducted only as they might suit the convenience and
caprice of litigants, but few cases would ever be brought to
a successful termination.
The neglect of Appellant is apparent in the record from the inception
of the relationship between Valley Leas:lng and Mr. Houghton.

Respondent did

not seek out Appellant for lease of equipment until such time as Appellant had
indicated a desire to enter into an equipment lease.

It was only after initial

contact and investigation that Respondent purchased the equipnent for leasL""lg
specifically to Mr· Houghton.

Respondent maintains no inventory of equipment

and would not have purchased the equipnent but for Mr. Houghton's desire to
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obtain possession of it.

Mr. Houghton retained possession of the equipnent

for more than three months after giving Respondent a rubber check.
has never paid any money to Valley Leasing in this transaction.

Appellant

Respondent was

required to file an action in this matter and was required in normal course
to wait for more than a year for the matter to come up for trial.
After causing significant losses and damage to Respondent by the
issuance of his bad check and the total breach of his lease agreement, and after
neglecting his rights and his responsibilities with regard to his counsel and
the Court,

Appell~t

wants the judgment set aside.

Appellant has simply not shown that he exercised due diligence of a
man in his position or was prevented from appearing at trial because of circumstances over which he had no control.

He failed to contact or pay his attorneys,

to take any action during the year the case was pending in Court, and failed to
appear at trial even though it was possible for him to do so.
CONCLUSION
As to Point I, nothing in this case indicates that Appellant's

Answer was stricken and a default judgment entered.

Therefore, Appellant's

rights are limited to Rule 59 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and he has
failed to show that he is entitled to relief under Rule 59.
Assuming arguendo that Rule 60(b) applies, Appellant has failed to
establish that excusable neglect exists in this case.

Certainly the record

reflects much neglect by Appellant, but little, if any, appears to be excusable.
Critical to Appellant's position on Appeal, is showing in the record that Appel-
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lant exercised "due diligence".

It

is submitted, that any such showing on the

part of Appellant is lacking.
Absent a showing by Appellant that excusable neglect is clearly
established in the record, the refusal of the trial judge to set aside the
judgment was not an abuse of discretion and his Order should not be set aside.
~'DATED this J_ day of June, 1982.
Respectfully submitted,

Allen Sims
Attorney for Respondent

MAILING CERrIFICATE
The undersigned certifies that two (2) two and correct copies of the
foregoing Respondent's Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to Frank T. Mohlman,
., r~
Attorney for Appellant, 275 South Main Street, Tooele, Utah 84074, on the ..:::>
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day of June, 1982.
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